Skip to main content

Why the flu vaccine illustrates all that is wrong with the NHS

The UK's National Health Service is nudging ever closer to collapse. This fact is blatantly obvious to many. The political will to do anything about it is, however, sadly lacking. It is particularly disappointing that the Conservatives, in a position of strength, seem more interested in tackling the immigration 'problem' that isn't a problem, than getting to grips with the huge and pressing problem that is the health of the nation.
         As I have discussed before in this blog the NHS principle of free health care is simply unworkable in the modern world. That inevitably means some people are going to have to pay for treatment. This is already happening with the slow growth of the private system. Things would be much, much better, however, if the NHS would embrace the willingness of many to pay for better treatment. The flu vaccine provides a small but useful illustration of this issue.
          The flu vaccine is available free of charge on the NHS for young children and people aged over 65. What about the rest of us? More and more people want the vaccine and so a market has emerged to satisfy that demand. Indeed, the jab is now available at most major supermarkets for around £9-12 a shot. This means that many people are paying for a little bit of health care.  
          I don't think anyone sees anything wrong with the fact that some people get the jab for free and some don't. But, here is the crucial point: the NHS is denied the opportunity of making any money on the willingness of people to pay for this service. In our family, for instance, the kids go off to the local GP surgery to get their jabs while my wife and I go off to the local supermarket and pay £9. I, for one, would rather we just pay the NHS £18 and all get the jab at the same time.
        Clearly there is not a great deal of money to be made in flu jabs (although I doubt the supermarkets are doing it for the good of humanity). If the NHS did 1 million jabs at a profit of £1 at time then they still only make £1 million. This is not going to save an NHS short of billions of pounds. It is still, though, extra money that the NHS could make. If there was a willingness to sell other services then we might find the billions that are needed.
          The most common criticism of the NHS charging for some services is that it would create a two tier system. But, what is the problem with a two tier system? The beauty of a two tier system is that it can benefit both rich and poor. The rich gain because they can use their wealth to purchase a better quality service. The poor gain because the extra money coming into the NHS can improve services. Sure, there will be inequality. Everyone, though, gains. 
        As an example, consider waiting times to see a doctor. In the current climate a patient can consider themselves lucky if they get seen within an hour of the allotted time. Some people would be willing to pay to reduce that waiting time. Clearly, an option of fee for timely appointments would benefit the person who gets the 'better' service. The money that person spends can, however, be reinvested into the system to provide a better service to others.
      Indeed, those in the second tier may actually benefit most because they get the improvement for free! For instance, suppose it costs £100 for a timely appointment. Then the rich person gets seen on time but has to pay £100. Suppose that the extra revenue in the system reduces standard waiting times to 20 minutes. Then poor people get a better service and pay nothing for it. Everyone is a winner.
          So, rather than 'accept' that fee for service is 'necessary' for the NHS to survive, why not start to embrace it as something that can reinvigorate health care in the UK for everyone

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Revealed preference, WARP, SARP and GARP

The basic idea behind revealed preference is incredibly simple: we try to infer something useful about a person's preferences by observing the choices they make. The topic, however, confuses many a student and academic alike, particularly when we get on to WARP, SARP and GARP. So, let us see if we can make some sense of it all.           In trying to explain revealed preference I want to draw on a  study  by James Andreoni and John Miller published in Econometrica . They look at people's willingness to share money with another person. Specifically subjects were given questions like:  Q1. Divide 60 tokens: Hold _____ at $1 each and Pass _____ at $1 each.  In this case there were 60 tokens to split and each token was worth $1. So, for example, if they held 40 tokens and passed 20 then they would get $40 and the other person $20. Consider another question: Q2. D...

Nash bargaining solution

Following the tragic death of John Nash in May I thought it would be good to explain some of his main contributions to game theory. Where better to start than the Nash bargaining solution. This is surely one of the most beautiful results in game theory and was completely unprecedented. All the more remarkable that Nash came up with the idea at the start of his graduate studies!          The Nash solution is a 'solution' to a two-person bargaining problem . To illustrate, suppose we have Adam and Beth bargaining over how to split some surplus. If they fail to reach agreement they get payoffs €a and €b respectively. The pair (a, b) is called the disagreement point . If they agree then they can achieve any pair of payoffs within some set F of feasible payoff points . I'll give some examples later. For the problem to be interesting we need there to be some point (A, B) in F such that A > a and B > b. In...

Prisoners dilemma or stag hunt

Over Christmas I had chance to read The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure by Brian Skyrms. A nice read, very interesting and thought provoking. There’s a couple of things in the book that prompt further discussion. The one I want to focus on in this post is the distinction between the stag hunt game and the prisoners dilemma game.    To be sure what we are talking about, here is a specific version of both type of game. Adam and Eve independently need to decide whether to cooperate or defect. The payoff matrix details their payoff for any combination of choices, where the first number is the payoff of Adam and the second number the payoff of Eve. For example, in the Prisoners Dilemma, if Adam cooperates and Eve defects then Adam gets 65 and Eve gets 165. Prisoners Dilemma Eve Cooperate Defect Adam Cooperate 140, 140 65, 165 Defect 165,...