Skip to main content

Guilt aversion verus lie aversion, the case of Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton

One of the more bizarre aspects of the recent US Presidential election campaign was the ability of Donald Trump to tell more lies and half-truths than most of us would do in a lifetime and yet still claim that Hilary Clinton could not be trusted in office. Even more bizarre, was the fact that he got away with it! How can we possible make sense of this? Some might point to a dumb electorate. I think we can learn more by looking at guilt aversion.
             The concept of guilt aversion was formally introduced into game theory by Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin Dufwenberg with a paper published in the American Economic Review in 2007. (I should also mention a paper by Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg in Econometrica in 2006.) The basic idea is that a person only needs to feel guilt if they disappoint the expectations of others. To illustrate, consider Donald Trump's 'promise' to lock up Hilary Clinton. Nobody realistically expects Trump to fulfil this promise. But, because nobody realistically expects him to lock her up then he needs to feel no guilt making and breaking the promise. It is all cheap talk.
              If everything is all cheap talk then Trump can say what he likes, nobody can believe it, he can predict that nobody will believe it, and everything works out fine! And it is noticeable that post election none of his supporters seem particularly upset that many campaign promises have fallen by the wayside. The only promise people seem to really care about is his promise of trying to make America great again. If he does not fulfil on that promise then he really should feel guilt.
            Hilary Clinton, by contrast, seems to have been judged by different standards. She is expected to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. Which is presumably why the email controversy took on such a huge importance. Any sign that she had let down expectations was taken as a signal that she could not be trusted.
           Ultimately, though, this meant we have a good idea what Hilary was intending to do as President. With Donald Trump, by contrast, we don't have a clue. We have a good idea about some things he will not do - lock up Hilary, build a wall on the Mexican border etc. - but beyond that it is uncertainty. Usually uncertainty is a bad thing and Trump would not have had a chance. We seem to live in a world, however, where uncertainty is becoming ever more appealing to voters. That opens the door for a whole lot more bullshit in the future.
            Interestingly, the evidence of guilt aversion in the experimental lab is mixed. In particular, there is a fair amount of evidence for lie aversion. The basic idea here is that a person feels bad if they lie. In this case it is irrelevant whether or not anybody expects the person to keep their promise, the person simply does not like to break their promise. So, Donald Trump would feel averse to making a promise he knows he cannot keep. Which does not sound much like Donald Trump.
                   

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Honesty around the world

In my last post I looked at dishonesty in the banking industry. Sticking with a similar theme, this time I will at dishonesty across different countries.        Let us start with a study by David Pascual-Ezama and a long list of co-authors on 'Context dependent cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countries'. They asked 90 students in 16 different countries to perform a very simple task: toss a black and white coin and record the outcome. If the coin came up white the student obtained a red Lindt Lindor Truffle. If it came up black they got nothing. Crucially, the coin toss took place in private and so the student could report whatever outcome they wanted. If they wanted a chocolate then they simply had to report white. (The study contrasted three different methods of reporting - form put in a box, form given to the experimenter or verbally telling the experimenter - but I will skip those details here.)           The chart below summa...

Prisoners dilemma or stag hunt

Over Christmas I had chance to read The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure by Brian Skyrms. A nice read, very interesting and thought provoking. There’s a couple of things in the book that prompt further discussion. The one I want to focus on in this post is the distinction between the stag hunt game and the prisoners dilemma game.    To be sure what we are talking about, here is a specific version of both type of game. Adam and Eve independently need to decide whether to cooperate or defect. The payoff matrix details their payoff for any combination of choices, where the first number is the payoff of Adam and the second number the payoff of Eve. For example, in the Prisoners Dilemma, if Adam cooperates and Eve defects then Adam gets 65 and Eve gets 165. Prisoners Dilemma Eve Cooperate Defect Adam Cooperate 140, 140 65, 165 Defect 165,...

Revealed preference, WARP, SARP and GARP

The basic idea behind revealed preference is incredibly simple: we try to infer something useful about a person's preferences by observing the choices they make. The topic, however, confuses many a student and academic alike, particularly when we get on to WARP, SARP and GARP. So, let us see if we can make some sense of it all.           In trying to explain revealed preference I want to draw on a  study  by James Andreoni and John Miller published in Econometrica . They look at people's willingness to share money with another person. Specifically subjects were given questions like:  Q1. Divide 60 tokens: Hold _____ at $1 each and Pass _____ at $1 each.  In this case there were 60 tokens to split and each token was worth $1. So, for example, if they held 40 tokens and passed 20 then they would get $40 and the other person $20. Consider another question: Q2. D...